Recent events in Georgia have highlighted a critical aspect
of the dual-use dilemma often forgotten by scientists and researchers busily
applying their trade – It is not just the technology and scientific discoveries
that may be corrupted and utilised for nefarious purposes, but rather, it is the
perception of the research itself which can easily be exploited for political
gain.
Gennady
Onishchenko, Russia’s Chief Medical Officer and head of ‘RosPotrebNadzor’
the Russian consumer protection agency claimed late last month that a U.S
funded bio-lab in Georgia (the country not the US State) posed, “a direct
threat” to Russia and a “Direct
violation of the BWC”. This
statement was further echoed by Vyacheslav
Tetekin, a member of the Dumas Committee on Defence, who suggested that
there is a “perception that biological weapons are beginning to be used by the
Americans more and more widely. I see this situation from the point of
view of national security”. Both
officials firmly accuse the Georgian authorities of kowtowing to their U.S
puppet masters.
The ‘Richard G Lugar Center for Public Health Research’ in
Tbilisi, which is at the centre of this spat, saw a U.S investment of US$150 million into the
state of the art lab. Of course Georgian
officials were quick to
point out the absurdity of the comments and further highlighted the point that Russian
personnel had already inspected the facilities and, in fact, any expert or
specialist was welcome to do the same.
Whilst the likelihood of such a facility being used for a covert
biological weapons programme seems remote, it is crucial to note that the
spectre of dual-use potential still looms large in the minds of many.
Onishchenko had, earlier this year, claimed that Georgia
deliberately introduced African Swine Fever (ASF)
to Russia by parachuting in a regiment of infected pigs. This claim seems to compliment his earlier
fears that food and wine may be poisoned by the Georgians, presumably as some
kind of retribution for the 2008 war. It
also seems to have the added bonus of being yet another opportunity to lash out
at the Americans and their allies to fostering further animosity and ambiguity.
The reality is that the researchers at this facility are
little more than a giant political football, to be kicked around by competing
sides on the field of international politics.
The Cold War may be officially over, but a competitive legacy
undoubtedly still remains (albeit with a few Georgian players substituted into
the U.S team). For this football match,
a goal is not simply scored by conducting the best research but instead it’s
the media conferences and press coverage where the game is won and lost
(perhaps not a match for Wayne Rooney then).
The script between the U.S and Russia is by now almost
farcical, both sides repeating claims that would make a long running West-End
show like the ‘Mousetrap’ look
fresh. The U.S continues to highlight
the opacity surrounding the Russian
Biodefense programme, compliance issues and the inheritance of Soviet
activities. In retort the Russians ask for evidence and then point to dubious
dual-use activities and the U.S refusal to create verification
mechanisms for the BWC. Whilst, for
the rest of us, it seems that the science and real threats are usually cast
aside for yet another round of political point scoring. These competing narratives fail to enhance
security for any nation, instead they continue to fuel a cycle of anxiety that
should have long since passed.
For those conducting the actual research it is worth
remembering that problems with dual-use technologies are not confined to the
laboratory, indeed perception and PR can be just as dangerous a weapon as any
pathogen. Rhetoric and political stoushes serve only to fuel the security
dilemmas of old and detract from key biotech breakthroughs. The continued lack of verification protocols
in the BWC coupled with the often opaque (and in the case of Russia, some might
argue covert) nature of biodefense research will continue to pose a significant
threat to international security.
